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I. Introduction 
 
This report is intended to provide an overview of the current social, economic and political 
situation in five rayons (districts) of Kvemo Kartli province in south-eastern Georgia: Gardabani 
rayon, Marneuli rayon, Bolnisi rayon, Dmanisi rayon and Tsalka rayon. By identifying and 
providing information about the current problems impeding the regional integration of those 
parts of Kvemo Kartli province in which national minorities are concentrated, this working paper 
will act as a guide for defining priorities and ensuring more informed intervention in the area.   
 
Most of the fieldwork for this survey was carried out in these five rayons during the period 3 – 
17 September 2004 and is informed by data obtained from a total of forty-two interviews and 
two focus group discussions.  This fact-finding mission was also successful in serving an 
additional purpose at the grass roots level as it identified key stakeholders for a planned 
stakeholders’ meeting which will be initiated by ECMI in the near future.  
 
Dr. Jonathan Wheatley is a Research Associate for the project “Accounting for State-Building, 
Stability and Violent Conflict” (funded by the Volkswagen Foundation) at the Osteuropa Institut, 
Free University of Berlin.   
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II. Background Information 
 
Geographic Features and Ethnic Demography 
 
The province of Kvemo Kartli consists of six rayons or districts: Gardabani, Marneuli, 
Tetritsqaro, Bolnisi, Dmanisi and Tsalka. The administrative centre of Kvemo Kartli, Rustavi, is 
situated just 25 km from the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and the towns of Marneuli and Gardabani 
are also close to the capital (at distances of 39 km and 42 km respectively). The western rayons 
of Kvemo Kartli (Dmanisi, Tetritsqaro and Tsalka) are not only more remote from Tbilisi 
geographically, but are also rather mountainous; the town of Tsalka is situated approximately 
1,500 metres above sea level. 
 
This report will only consider five rayons of Kvemo Kartli: Gardabani, Marneuli, Bolnisi, 
Dmanisi and Tsalka, as it is here that national minorities are concentrated. The demographic 
balance in both the city of Rustavi and in Tetritsqaro rayon does not differ significantly from the 
rest of Georgia; these locations will therefore not be discussed in this paper. 
 
The three principal national minorities concentrated in Kvemo Kartli are Azeris, Armenians and 
Greeks. Azeris are by far the most numerous of the three groups; according to the 2002 census, 
284,761 Azeris live in Georgia (6.5% of the population) and 78.9% of these live in Kvemo 
Kartli. According to the same census, Azeris form an absolute majority of the population of 
Marneuli, Bolnisi and Dmanisi rayons and more than 40% of the population in Gardabani rayon 
(see Table 1). The origin of Georgia’s Azeri population can be traced back to the eleventh 
century, when the first nomadic Turkic tribes entered the region. Their numbers swelled further 
by a subsequent wave of migration by the Iuruq and Qizilbash Turks in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.1 The majority of Azeris in Georgia belong to the Shi’ite branch of Islam, 
although in Kvemo Kartli religion is rather weak and little distinction is made between the two 
branches of Islam (Sunni and Shi'ite). 
 
Armenians and Greeks in Kvemo Kartli are mainly concentrated in Tsalka rayon, although 
communities of both nationalities can also be found in other rayons. Both groups settled in the 
region in the first half of the nineteenth century after leaving the territory of the Ottoman Empire 
                                               
1 George Sanikidze and Edward W. Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, Working Paper for the 
Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (University of California, Berkeley, Fall 2004) at http://ist-
socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications/2004_04-sani.pdf.  
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(mainly Anatolia). According to the 2002 census, a majority of the population of Tsalka rayon is 
Armenian, as most Greeks have left the area to resettle in either Greece or Russia.  A large 
number of Georgians have been arriving to replace them, mainly from Ajara and Svaneti (see 
below). The estimated 22% listed as Greek in Table 1 may be an overestimate since more Greeks 
have left since the census was taken. As a result of their provenance from the Ottoman lands, 
most of Tsalka’s Greeks are Turkish speaking. 
 
Table 1: Ethnic Composition of Five Rayons of Kvemo Kartli (2002 Census) 
 
Rayon Georgians Azeris Armenians Greeks Russians 
Gardabani 53.20% 43.72% 0.93% 0.21% 0.87% 
Marneuli 8.04% 83.10% 7.89% 0.33% 0.44% 
Bolnisi 26.82% 65.98% 5.81% 0.59% 0.56% 
Tsalka 12.02% 9.54% 54.98% 21.97% 0.60% 
Dmanisi 31.24% 66.76% 0.52% 0.78% 0.56% 
 
Georgians have traditionally formed a small minority in these five rayons. However, their 
numbers increased in the early 1950s, as inhabitants from other regions of Georgia, particularly 
Imereti, began to settle there. For example, the villages of Tsereteli and Orjonikidze in Marneuli 
rayon were founded by settlers from Sachkhere and Tchiatura rayons in 1950. A second wave of 
(Georgian) immigration occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s when migrants from Svaneti 
arrived after escaping landslides and avalanches in their homeland. These new migrants settled 
in all five rayons, but the largest number settled in Gardabani rayon and the town of Dmanisi. A 
further wave of migration from Svaneti began in 2004 as a result of floods and mudslides in the 
district of Mestia. Many of these new migrants came to Tsalka rayon, especially to the town of 
Tsalka. Finally, two waves of migration of Georgians from the mountainous regions of Ajara 
occurred. The first of these waves, which began in the late 1980s as a result of landslides, had 
limited impact on Kvemo Kartli, as most of the new migrants settled in Samtskhe-Javakheti. The 
second wave of migration from Ajara began in 1998 as rural inhabitants from the mountainous 
regions of Ajara (mainly Khulo rayon) left their land, once again as a result of landslides and soil 
erosion. This wave of migration, which was continuing at the time of writing, has had a very 
major impact on the demographic balance of Tsalka rayon. The figure given in Table 1 for the 
Georgian population of Tsalka rayon (12%) is probably an underestimate, given that most new 
arrivals from Ajara have simply occupied houses deserted by the Greek population and are 
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therefore not officially registered. Moreover, since the time the census was taken, many more 
migrants have arrived. Only one village in Tsalka rayon (Rekha) is originally ethnic Georgian. 
 
According to the 2002 census, Kvemo Kartli is the province in Georgia that has been subject to 
the highest levels of emigration. Figures for 2002 show an 18.2% reduction in the population of 
Kvemo Kartli in comparison with 1989. As Table 2 (below) shows, the steepest decline in the 
population has occurred in the Dmanisi and Tsalka rayons. The fact that the population of Tsalka 
rayon is less than half what it was in 1989 probably reflects the emigration of the Greek 
population. 
  
Table 2: Population Figures in Five Rayons of Kvemo Kartli (from the 1989 and 2002 
Census Figures) 
 
Rayon 1989 Population 2002 Population 
Gardabani 114,762 114,348 
Marneuli 120,394 118,221 
Bolnisi 81,547 74,301 
Tsalka 44,438 20,888 
Dmanisi 51,844 28,034 
KVEMO KARTLI 608,491 497,530 
 
Economy and Infrastructure 
 
Vegetable-growing is the main economic activity and potatoes are the main crop. One source 
estimated that 126,000 tonnes of potatoes were produced in Kvemo Kartli in 2000, which made 
up 41.8% of all potatoes produced in Georgia. According to this source, in the same year, 
Kvemo Kartli produced 25.4% of all vegetables produced in Georgia.2 Fruit and grain (mainly 
wheat and maize) production is also significant, particularly in the Gardabani and Marneuli 
rayons. Livestock-breeding also plays an important role in the local economy, especially in the 
mountainous regions where hayfields make up a large proportion of agricultural land. 
 
A major problem involves the distribution of land that previously belonged to collective farms 
(kolkhozy and sovkhozy). According to a 1992 decree, which stipulated how kolkhoz and sovkhoz 
                                               
2 Figures were provided by the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. 
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land was to be distributed, the strip of land within 21 km of the Georgian border could not be 
allotted to private individuals. This strip included much of the Gardabani, Marneuli, Bolnisi and 
Dmanisi rayons. Moreover, according to the 1996 “Law on Ownership of Agricultural Land,” 
the government reserved the right to retain control of land resources within that border zone and 
therefore much of the land close to the border with Armenia and Azerbaijan remained in the 
hands of various government agencies. In Marneuli rayon, for example, land around the villages 
of Kachaghana, Takalo, Kapanakhtsi and Sadakhlo was nominally owned by the Ministry of 
Defence. However, the soldiers never used it and the land was instead exploited for private 
profit.  
 
For the most part, sovkhoz and kolkhoz land that was not privatised was leased out in a non-
transparent manner. Very often the bulk of this land was rented by “local notables,” often former 
sovkhoz directors or individuals with close personal links to members of the local administration. 
Most of these individuals were ethnic Georgians, since many Azeri directors of collective farms 
were replaced by Georgians (often “resettlers” from Svaneti) during the wave of nationalist 
mobilisation in 1989-91. Only a small minority of these “notables” were Azeri. Some private 
individuals renting the land even lived in other areas of Georgia. On occasions these 
“latifondisti” sub-let the land to local residents at vastly inflated prices. This practice was 
particularly prevalent in Bolnisi rayon, where potato growing provided a relatively high cash 
crop. Several local respondents in Bolnisi rayon complained that land was sub-let at prices of up 
to 600 USD per year, in comparison with a state price of 60-70 Lari (approx. 35 USD) for top-
quality land.  
 
Although the law prohibiting the distribution of land to private individuals in the 21km border 
zone was relaxed somewhat in the mid-1990s, allowing inhabitants to own small household 
plots, the (mainly Azeri) residents of Gardabani, Marneuli and Bolnisi rayons received only a 
fraction of the land that rural households received in most other regions of Georgia, where 
collective farm land was fully privatised. Most households received between 0.1 and 0.3 hectares 
of land. In Dmanisi rayon, more of the former sovkoz lands were distributed to the population, 
probably because of the relatively low quality of the land in the upland parts of the rayon 
(generally used to produce hay for livestock). 
 
A further problem was that after the collective farms had been abolished, most of the farm 
machinery was either sold by the former collective farm directors or fell into disrepair. Many 
villages are therefore left with no machinery to cultivate or irrigate the land, and villagers are 
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forced to tend their plots by hand. Thus, despite the high quality of the soil, agricultural 
productivity is rather low and the economic potential of the land is far from being fully realised. 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the productive capacity of local industry fell to a 
fraction of what it had been and continued to fall throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
electricity-producing unit Gardabani GRES was previously considered the main industrial entity 
in Gardabani rayon. However, according to the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and 
Development (CIPDD), following the closure of some blocks and the privatization of others, the 
number of people working for Gardabani GRES fell from 1,800 people to around 200.3 Due to 
the non-payment of electricity bills, often many of those still working there did not receive their 
salaries. The Madneuli gold mines near Kazreti in Bolnisi rayon are also a significant source of 
employment for the local population, but only for those living close to the mines (i.e. in Bolnisi 
rayon and parts of Dmanisi rayon). 
 
On the other hand, by late 2002, the volume of trade had increased significantly, particularly in 
Marneuli rayon, thanks to the growth of the market at the Red Bridge on the border with 
Azerbaijan. However, this market is unregulated, so the government receives virtually no money 
from taxation and it is notorious for the transit of narcotics and other contraband. In May 2004 
an attempt was made to crack down on the trade of contraband on the Red Bridge. 
 
Emigrant remittances also provide an indispensable source of income for some rural families, 
particularly amongst ethnic Armenians in Tsalka rayon. Most migration is seasonal and involves 
the economically active male population, who go to Russia for temporary employment, often in 
the construction sector. Although a significant minority emigrate permanently, most return to 
their villages during the winter period to tend their crops. 
 
As in most rural areas of Georgia, Kvemo Kartli suffers from serious infrastructure problems. 
The supply of electricity and water is highly irregular, particularly in the more remote highland 
areas far from Tbilisi. In most rural zones villagers have to rely on natural sources, such as well 
and springs, in order to obtain drinking water – often with deleterious effects on their health. In 
most areas, the roads are in a state of disrepair; this is particularly true of the more mountainous 
regions. In Tsalka rayon, one road (leading to Tetritskaro) has recently been rehabilitated by 
British Petroleum (BP) as part of the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline project; the rest are 
                                               
3 Ibid. 
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little more than dirt tracks and are often closed in the winter. Gas supplies are another problem. 
Very few settlements are provided with natural gas. Finally, cultural and educational facilities 
are often in very poor condition; most schools need repairing and most villages have no 
kindergartens, libraries or sports’ centres. 
 
For most of the province there is relatively easy access to Tbilisi, except in the more remote 
areas of Dmanisi and Tsalka rayons. Marneuli is 45 minutes by car from Tbilisi, Gardabani – 60 
minutes, Bolnisi – 90 minutes, and Dmanisi and Tsalka – two to two-and-a-half hours. 
Minibuses (marshrutki) make frequent journeys (every 20-30 minutes) from Tbilisi to Marneuli 
and Gardabani, and travel somewhat less frequently to Bolnisi, Dmanisi and Tsalka. There is 
also a railway line from Tbilisi to Tsalka via Tetritskaro, but trains to Tsalka are infrequent and 
unreliable. 
 
Another major feature of the local infrastructure is the BTC oil pipeline, which will pass through 
Gardabani, Marneuli and Tsalka rayons. However, despite the fanfare, the pipeline has provided 
few benefits for the inhabitants of these districts, except for those whose villages lie in the direct 
path of the pipeline (see below). 
 
Local Structures of Administration 
 
At the rayon level and below, the administrative structure in Kvemo Kartli is, like in other parts 
of Georgia, a legacy of the communist period. The first layer of local government consists of 
locally elected bodies or sakrebulos for each of the five major towns (Gardabani, Marneuli, 
Bolnisi, Dmanisi and Tsalka) and for villages or communities (i.e. groups of villages or temi in 
Georgian) in rural areas. Gardabani, Marneuli and Bolnisi have their own directly elected 
mayors, as do all of the main cities of rayons with a voting population of more than 5,000. As 
the voting population in the towns of Dmanisi and Tsalka is less than 5,000, the head of the 
executive branch in these two towns is the chairperson of the sakrebulo, as specified by law. 
Since the new local election law came into force in 2001, for sakrebulo elections, voters are 
presented with a list of candidates and the candidates obtaining the most votes are declared the 
victors. In most community sakrebulos, as well as in the sakrebulos of Dmanisi and Tsalka 
towns, five candidates are elected to the sakrebulo. In the towns of Bolnisi and Gardabani, as 
well as in certain larger rural communities of Marneuli, Bolnisi and Gardabani rayons, seven 
sakrebulo members are elected. Finally, in the city of Marneuli, with a voting population of more 
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than 10,000, nine members are elected. In Kvemo Kartli most sakrebulos include between one 
and eight villages (see Appendix 1). 
 
The role of the sakrebulo in Georgia is mainly supervisory: they have the right to amend the 
local budget, approve long-term development plans and they can evaluate the work of the 
executive bodies. They also have limited powers to impose and remove local taxes.  
 
Real power, however, rests with the executive branch of local government, or gamgeoba, at the 
second level of local government, i.e. at the rayon level. The head of the rayon gamgeoba, 
known as the gamgebeli, is appointed by the President of Georgia from amongst the chairpersons 
of the town and community/village sakrebulos. Prior to the 2001 law, rayon gamgebelis were not 
required to be elected to a sakrebulo. The new legal stipulation that they be elected has made 
little difference, as in all five rayons considered in this paper the incumbent gamgebelis were 
able to retain their posts during the 2002 local elections by arranging to be elected to local 
sakrebulos. Since the “Rose Revolution” of November 2003, all the gamgebelis in the five 
rayons have been replaced. However, none of those appointed to replace them had been elected 
to a sakrebulo in June 2002. As such, their formal position is that of “acting gamgebel”’. 
 
A third unofficial level of government was introduced by the government of Eduard 
Shevardnadze in 1994. These are the nine provinces or mkhare, which more or less correspond to 
the historical regions of Georgia and which are administered by an authorised representative or 
“governor” appointed by the President of Georgia. Originally the governor’s post was entirely 
informal and not defined by law and, although the provinces acquired legal status when a new 
law on administrative territorial arrangement was passed in February 1997, the competences of 
the governor remain poorly defined.4  
 
From 1994 until September 2003, the post of governor in Kvemo Kartli was held by one 
individual – Levan Mamaladze. Following Mamaladze’s decision to stand for the post of deputy 
for the single mandate constituency of Bolnisi in the parliamentary elections of November 2003, 
Zurab Kobiashvili was appointed governor in his place. His term of office lasted only until the 
so-called Rose Revolution of November 2003, when Zurab Melikishvili was appointed to replace 
him. Following Melikishvili’s appointment as State Minister in charge of regional policy and 
local self-government in February 2004, Ioseb Mazmishvili was appointed to the post of 
                                               
4 See Ghia Nodia (ed.), Political System in Georgia, (Tbilisi: Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and 
Development, 1998) at www.cipdd.org/cipdd_g/pdf/eurob_e.pdf. 
 12
governor. However, in December President Mikheil Saakashvili dismissed Mazmishvili and 
reappointed Melikishvili following a land dispute over a horse farm in the village of Kulari, in 
which an elderly woman was killed (see Section V below). Another reason for Mazmishvili’s 
replacement was that little progress had been made in combating smuggling along the border 
with Azerbaijan. 
 
Unlike in Javakheti, where top posts at the rayon level, such as gamgebeli, district prosecutor, 
chief of police and head of the tax inspectorate are held by ethnic Armenians, in Kvemo Kartli 
all of these posts are held by Georgians, even in Marneuli rayon, where Azeris make up over 
80% of the population. In Marneuli, Gardabani and Bolnisi rayons the first deputy gamgebeli is 
Azeri. 
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III. Recent Historical Events 
 
The wave of national mobilisation that occurred amongst ethnic Georgians in 1989 was to have 
negative consequences for the Azeri inhabitants of Kvemo Kartli. In late 1989, the 800 or so 
families that had hitherto been living in the city of Bolnisi were forced to leave their homes. 
Henceforth, Bolnisi became an ethnically homogeneous Georgian city. At the same time many 
Azeris who had previously held top posts in the state administration as directors of agricultural 
or industrial enterprises were replaced by Georgians. Many ordinary Azeris who held lower 
ranking posts in the state administration were also dismissed. This process aroused great unrest  
amongst the local Azeri population and at the end of 1989 a local initiative group was formed 
with the idea of establishing a kind of “popular front” for the Azeri population. As a result of this 
initiative, the organisation Geyrat held its inaugural conference in February 1990. Geyrat united 
Azeris from different backgrounds, although the Azeri intelligentsia played a particularly 
significant role. 
 
The aims of the new movement were first to halt the rapid emigration of Azeris from Georgia, 
and second, to establish a dialogue with the Georgian national liberation movement. With this 
end in mind, Geyrat's leaders met Georgian nationalist leaders such as Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 
Giorgi Tchanturia and Irakli Tsereteli. The movement achieved a certain degree of success in 
establishing a rapport with Tchanturia and his National Democratic Party (NDP) and one 
member of the organisation was elected to the National Congress on the NDP's party list.5 
However, the Azeri community faced renewed pressure after the victory of Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia’s “Round Table - Free Georgia” bloc in the October 1990 elections to the 
Georgian Supreme Soviet. The pressure lessened somewhat as a result of the war in South 
Ossetia, which broke out in January 1991, as Gamsakhurdia's attention was focused elsewhere. 
 
During the period 1992-94, Kvemo Kartli fell under the influence of various criminal gangs 
associated with the Mkhedrioni and other criminal organisations. The province suffered from a 
particularly high level of bandit activity because the main roads to Armenia and Azerbaijan were 
used for smuggling contraband and were therefore controlled by paramilitaries. For example, the 
village of Vakhtangisi in Gardabani rayon, which is located on the border with Azerbaijan, was a 
major trading post for drugs and was controlled by the Mkhedrioni as well as an Azeri 
                                               
5 The National Congress was an alternative parliament established by those parties that were boycotting the official 
elections to the Supreme Soviet that were held on 28 October 1990 (and won by Gamsakhurdia's “Round Table” 
bloc). Elections to the National Congress were held on 30 September 1990. 
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paramilitary group. Only after a joint anti-criminal operation was carried out in the village in 
March 1995 by the Georgian and Azerbaijani governments was some semblance of order 
restored. Kidnapping for ransom was also a common occurrence and Azeri residents felt that 
they were disproportionally singled out for such attacks. 
 
During this period Geyrat helped to protect the security of Azeri citizens. Under their initiative, 
patrol groups of druzhinniki (vigilantes) were formed in many villages to protect local residents. 
The organisation was strongest in Marneuli and it successfully prevented mass emigration from 
this town, which many people consider to be the “capital” of the Azeri-populated Georgian 
lands. However, in areas where Geyrat was weaker, such as Dmanisi, emigration of the Azeri 
population continued. 
 
From 1995 stability returned to Kvemo Kartli as the government of Eduard Shevardnadze 
completed its crackdown on the Mkhedrioni and other paramilitary groups. At the provincial 
level power was now in the hands of Levan Mamaladze, an ambitious young politician who had 
previously belonged to the Green Party. During the period of Mamaladze’s governorship of 
Kvemo Kartli, stability was preserved by means of patron-client networks, which provided a 
channel of communication between the state and influential figures from within the Azeri 
community. Members of Geyrat were gradually co-opted into the local power structures, first by 
being offered posts in the local administration and later by playing an active role in the pro-
government party, the Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG). In the 1999 parliamentary elections, 
Zumrud Qurbanov, one of the leaders of Geyrat, was elected to parliament on the CUG party list, 
and another Azeri, Azer Suleimanov, was elected as a single mandate member of parliament for 
Marneuli, with Geyrat’s backing.6 
 
The majority of the population of Kvemo Kartli now overwhelmingly backed both Eduard 
Shevardnadze as President and the CUG as the ruling party. This trend was already evident in the 
1995 parliamentary and presidential elections and was further strengthened in the 1998 local 
elections (when the CUG garnered around 70% of the vote in Kvemo Kartli) and in the 1999 
parliamentary elections. According to official figures, in the 2000 presidential elections, 98% of 
those eligible to vote in Marneuli rayon voted and 99% of these voted for the incumbent, Eduard 
Shevardnadze.7 While electoral fraud clearly played a role in these unrealistically inflated 
                                               
6 Rezonansi No. 295, 27 October 1999. 
7 Laurence Broers and Julian Broxup, Crisis and Renewal in Georgian Politics: The 2003 Parliamentary Elections 
and 2004 Presidential Elections (a report written for the London Information Network on Conflicts and State 
Building, 2004) at http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/Ethnologie-Kaukasus/html/aktu/crisis.pdf.  
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figures, it remains true that an overwhelming majority of voters supported the incumbent. Voters 
belonging to national minorities felt that the best way to protect their interests was to show 
complete loyalty to the Georgian President. The return of peace and stability which accompanied 
Shevardnadze’s victory over the paramilitary groups also contributed to securing that loyalty. 
Moreover, the support given to Shevardnadze by Azerbaijan’s President, Heidar Aliyev, also 
helped win the support of Azeri voters. Many Azeris saw Aliyev as their “natural leader” (see 
below). 
 
Despite the support shown to Shevardnadze and the CUG by the Azeri population of Kvemo 
Kartli, Geyrat’s decision to co-operate with the authorities to the extent of accepting positions in 
the local bureaucracy and in the party undermined the movement’s reputation as an independent 
defender of the public interest. The movement began to split. In 1998, Geyrat members passed a 
vote of no confidence in Alibali Askerov, who was then the Chairman of the organisation. 
Askerov and Qurbanov then left the organisation to form a breakaway group. Although Geyrat 
was reunited the following year with Askerov once again at its helm, the rift weakened the 
movement. Nevertheless, Geyrat continued to play a mediating role between society and the 
state and remained active in defending the rights of members of the Azeri community who had 
been unfairly treated by the police or other organs of power. 
 
Mamaladze had informal control over all appointments in Kvemo Kartli province, including the 
nomination of candidates from the province to the national Parliament.8 He actively promoted 
the candidacies of ethnic Azeris; six Azeri deputies who were elected to the 1999 parliament 
later joined the “Alliance For a New Georgia” faction that was formed under his initiative when 
the CUG collapsed in late 2001. The members of parliament for the single-mandate 
constituencies of Gardabani, Marneuli, Bolnisi, Dmanisi and Tsalka (three Georgians, one Azeri 
and one Armenian) also joined this faction.9 At the same time, Mamladze's clientele in local state 
organs (for example, the gamgeobas) remained dominated by ethnic Georgians, particularly 
former officials of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol).  
 
                                                
8 Officially the President was responsible for the nomination of gamgebelis; informally he appointed upon the 
recommendation of Levan Mamaladze. 
9 Five of the six Azeri deputies entered parliament through the CUG party list, presumably on Mamaladze's 
recommendation. The sixth (Azer Suleimanov) was elected member of Parliament for the single mandate 
constituency of Marneuli. The Georgian members of Parliament for the single-mandate constituencies of Gardabani, 
Bolnisi and Dmanisi (Leonide Japaridze, Guram Avkopashvili and Teimuraz Tsikhelashvili), as well as the 
Armenian member for Tsalka (Iurk Khchoyan) also joined Mamaladze's "Alliance for a New Georgia" faction. 
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As well as being the key figure behind the appointment of local officials, Mamaladze also seems 
to have had considerable control over local economic resources, in particular the Madneuli gold 
mines located near the village of Kazreti in Bolnisi rayon. The former director of the mines, 
Zurab Lobzhanidze, was a client of Mamaladze’s, as was a former deputy director, Guram 
Avkopashvili, who was elected Member of Parliament in the single-mandate constituency of 
Bolnisi in the 1999 parliamentary elections. Mamaladze was also the driving force behind the 
creation of the Confederation of Entrepreneurs in February 1999. This united leaders of the 
Rustavi metallurgical plant, executives at Madneuli, heads of some smaller enterprises and 
representatives of banks in the province. Merab Asanishvili, Mamaladze’s first deputy, was 
named the President of the Confederation.10 Following the so-called ‘Rose Revolution’, many 
members of Mamaladze’s clientele and even members of his family were indicted for 
corruption.11 Lobzhanidze was accused by Georgian prosecutors of attempting to smuggle gold 
out of Georgia and Mamaladze himself was placed on Interpol’s wanted list for fraud.  
 
The first major challenge to Mamaladze's hegemony in Kvemo Kartli came from Mikheil 
Saakashvili's opposition National Movement in the run-up to the November 2003 parliamentary 
elections. Mamaladze had decided to stand as a candidate for the pro-presidential "For a New 
Georgia" (FNG) bloc in the single-mandate seat of Bolnisi. At the same time, the National 
Movement put forward their own candidate for the constituency, the ethnic Azeri Kamal 
Muradkhanov, and began actively campaigning in the province. This led to a violent clash 
between supporters of Saakashvili and supporters of Mamaladze in the village of Talaveri 
(Faraklo) near Bolnisi in late September.12 Many people from both sides were injured, including 
the gamgebeli of Bolnisi rayon, Zurab Japaridze. Although the National Movement failed to 
make any real inroads in Kvemo Kartli during those elections, this event was highly significant 
as it boosted the party's support in the country as a whole. 
 
As in previous elections, the November 2003 parliamentary elections were highly controlled, 
especially in the rayons of Gardabani, Marneuli and Bolnisi, where FNG won by a wide margin 
and Mamaladze's chosen candidates managed resounding victories. Once again, electoral fraud 
was a highly significant part of the story, but not the only part. Most (but not all) Azeris 
remained loyal to President Eduard Shevardnadze. In Dmanisi and Tsalka, however, 
                                                
10 Georgian Times, 26 February 1999, quoting Dilis Gazeti, 24 February 1999; Resonance, 94, 27 April - 3 May 
1999. 
11 Sources: TRACCC, Survey of the Georgian Press at http://www.traccc.cdn.ge/georgian-press/2003, accessed 
August 2004; Maia Mosiashvili, “Levan Mamaladze’s Brother-In-Law Declared Wanted”, 24 Hours (16 April 
2004). 
12 Talaveri is the Georgian name of the village, while Faraklo is the original (Azeri) name. 
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Mamaladze's control over the electoral process was much weaker; in the single-mandate seat of 
Dmanisi, independent candidate Kakhaber Okriashvili beat another independent, Akaki 
Dautashvili, by a very narrow margin, pushing the former gamgebeli, Shota Tsikhelashvili, into 
third place. In Tsalka, ethnic Armenian Aik Meltonian, a staunch opponent of the rayon 
gamgebeli, was elected Member of Parliament with the support of the bloc "Industry Will Save 
Georgia". 
 
Following the so-called “Rose Revolution” and Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation on 23 
November 2003, Levan Mamaladze left the country. Presidential elections were held on 4 
January 2004 and repeat elections for the 150 members of parliament elected by party list were 
held on 28 March 2004 (the results of the November elections to single-mandate constituencies 
were left to stand). In both elections voters in Kvemo Kartli expressed support for the new 
authorities in much the same way as they had for the old. In the repeat parliamentary elections 
76% of voters voted for the bloc that supported the new government “National Movement – 
Democrats” compared with 67% in the country as a whole.13 Once again the tried and tested 
methods of electoral fraud were employed, although this time the authorities were somewhat less 
prepared to tolerate such practices and as a result the returns from around thirty precincts from 
Gardabani, Marneuli and Bolnisi rayons were declared invalid. 
 
                                               
13 Tea Lobzhanidze, “Georgia: Azerbaijanis Back Saakashvili” CRS No. 225, 1 April 2004 on the website of 
International War and Peace Reporting www.iwpr.net.  
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IV Actors in the Local Arena 
 
The Local Authorities 
 
Throughout Shevardnadze’s presidency (1995-2003) by far the most powerful figure at the local 
level was Levan Mamaladze and most members of local power structures in Kvemo Kartli (at 
least outside the city of Rustavi) owed their positions to Mamaladze’s patronage (see above). At 
the same time, at the rayon level the gamgebelis (also mostly clients of Mamaladze) wielded 
considerable power, especially in Marneuli and Bolnisi rayons, where they were seen as 
powerful figures in their own right. Zurab Japaridze, gamgebeli of Bolnisi rayon until the ‘Rose 
Revolution,’ became an especially popular figure in the city of Bolnisi as a result of 
rehabilitation work carried out on the city’s public buildings (such as schools, the library, the 
sports stadium) in 2000-2001. Critics, however, claim that the funds for reconstruction were 
obtained illegally from the Madneuli gold mines (see above).  
 
In the Azeri-populated areas of Gardabani, Marneuli and Bolnisi rayons, villages are 
considerably larger than in other parts of Georgia and community (temi) sakrebulos, which 
typically consist of several villages, may include a population of up to ten thousand people.14 
Under these circumstances, the gamgebeli at the community level is often perceived as a more 
powerful figure than in other rayons of Georgia, where sakrebulos include a few hundred or, at 
most, a couple of thousand inhabitants. However, despite being formally elected by the 
population, the gamgebelis of these large communities are almost invariably perceived as 
representatives of the authorities rather than accountable to the people who ostensibly elected 
them. This is particularly so because the authorities at the rayon level generally “recommend” 
who to vote for at local elections and their “recommendation” is generally heeded, especially in 
Azeri villages. Electoral fraud also plays a significant role. Thus, at least informally, most 
community gamgebelis are subordinate to the rayon gamgebeli. 
 
                                               
14 The most populous sakrebulos, according to the 2002 census, are Nakhiduri (in Bolnisi rayon – 9,026 
inhabitants), Aghtakala (Gardabani rayon – 11,306), Martqopi (Gardabani rayon – 10,646), Sartitchala (Gardabani 
rayon – 10,599), Algeti (Marneuli rayon – 13,380), Sadakhlo (Marneuli rayon – 11,299), Kapanakhchi (Marneuli 
rayon – 10,196) and Shulaveri (Marneuli rayon – 9,007). Of the thirty-four villages included in these seven 
sakrebulos, thirty are mainly Azeri. 
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Ethnic Balance in the Recruitment of Personnel 
 
Following the two rounds of parliamentary elections in November 2003 and March 2004 the 
number of Azeri deputies fell from six to just three. The three Azeri members are Adil Jafarov, 
elected in the single-mandate constituency of Marneuli in November 2003 with the support of 
FNG, Alakhverd Umbatov, former member of Zurab Zhvania's “United Democrats,” elected 
through the party list of the bloc “National Movement – Democrats” in March 2004, and Kamal 
Muradkhanov (see above), also elected through the party list of the bloc “National Movement – 
Democrats” in March 2004. Following Mamaladze's decision to leave the country, in March 
2004 repeat elections were also held in the single-mandate constituency of Bolnisi (which, 
according to official figures, Mamaladze had won with 86.86% of the vote in November). 
Victory went to Sophiko Lartsuliani, former deputy gamgebeli of the rayon (under Zurab 
Japaridze) and a close associate of the parliamentary chairperson Nino Burjanadze. 
 
Generally speaking, local power structures in Kvemo Kartli are dominated by ethnic Georgians. 
Ethnic Azeris are particularly under-represented, especially in comparison with Armenians, in 
Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda rayons. During the communist period many top posts were held 
by Azeris (see above) and throughout much of the 1980s the post of raikom, First Secretary of 
Marneuli, was held by an Azeri, K. Mamedov. Today the highest post in the local administration 
to which an Azeri can aspire is the post of first deputy gamgebeli. At the time of writing, the 
gamgebelis, district Prosecutors,15 the district chiefs of police, the heads of the Tax Inspectorate 
and the heads of the district education department in all five rayons were Georgians. In 
Gardabani rayon, two out of four deputy gamgebelis are Azeri. In Marneuli, Bolnisi and Dmanisi 
rayons, despite the fact that the majority of the population in all three rayons is Azeri, at the time 
when this study was being carried out only one out of four deputy gamgebelis was Azeri. In 
Tsalka, the first deputy gamgebeli was Armenian. The under-representation of the Azeri 
population in local power structures is particularly marked in Bolnisi and Dmanisi rayons, where 
all or almost all of the Azeri population no longer live in the rayon centre; here even the police 
force is almost exclusively Georgian, except for the occasional Azeri policeman in the villages. 
Generally, throughout Kvemo Kartli the top ranks of the police force are dominated by 
Georgians, although in Marneuli and Gardabani rayons there are many lower ranking Azeri 
police officers.  
                                               
15 At the time of writing reforms were underway in the Prosecutors’ Office and as a result the Prosecutors’ Office of 
Tsalka rayon had been combined with that of Marneuli rayon, while the Prosecutor’s Office of Dmanisi rayon had 
been combined with that of Bolnisi rayon. 
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In addition, there is a tendency for local cadres (both Georgians and members of national 
minorities) to have weak links with the districts in which they work. Many are not local and 
come from either Tbilisi or Rustavi. The appointment of non-local personnel to local power 
structures became prevalent during the governorship of Levan Mamaladze, but has continued to 
the present day. On occasions, individuals are appointed who have spent their childhood in the 
district or have kinship links with local inhabitants, but still have little knowledge of the area in 
which they are supposed to work. Following the “Rose Revolution,” some local stakeholders 
have complained that since the end of 2003 administrative structures in Kvemo Kartli have 
become increasingly dominated by young personnel who simply gained their positions by 
participating in the “Revolution” but who lack experience working in the province.16 Others link 
this state of affairs to the fact that there are simply no sufficiently qualified personnel who speak 
the state language (i.e. Georgian) and who live permanently in the rural districts of Kvemo 
Kartli. 
 
In Marneuli rayon the turnover of personnel in local power structures since the “Rose 
Revolution” has been particularly marked. Here even the gamgebelis of villages and 
communities (temi) have been replaced in a manner that hardly conforms to the spirit of the law. 
Out of the seventeen village and community gamgebelis elected in Marneuli rayon in the local 
elections of June 2002, by mid-2004 eleven had been “persuaded” to write letters of resignation 
to prevent “compromising material” (kompromat) from being used against them for alleged past 
“misdeeds” committed during Mamaladze’s time as governor. Out of eleven ethnic Azeri 
community gamgebelis, seven resigned. All three Armenian gamgebelis, as well as the one 
Greek gamgebeli, also resigned. The three Georgian gamgebelis, however, retained their posts. 
This led to complaints by some representatives of national minorities that their own people had 
been subject to particular pressure. 
 
In Tsalka rayon, the former rayon gamgebeli, Eldar Khvistani, was removed from his post in a 
rather dramatic fashion at the end of 2003 as a result of action by mainly Armenian and Greek 
inhabitants. Khvistani, a Svan, was accused of favouring newcomers from Ajara and Svaneti at 
the expense of “locals.” As a result, a group of angry inhabitants burst into the gamgeoba 
                                               
16 The governor and deputy governor of Kvemo Kartli, as well as some newly-appointed gamgebelis and deputy 
gamgebelis belong to this new generation. Some had begun their political career relatively recently as activists for 
the National Movement. 
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building and beat him severely. This episode illustrates the tensions that have arisen lately in 
Tsalka rayon between “local residents” and “newcomers.” 
 
Political Parties 
 
Political parties play virtually no role whatsoever in the life of most ordinary inhabitants of 
Kvemo Kartli, except during election time. As mentioned above, voters in Kvemo Kartli – 
especially members of national minorities – voted overwhelmingly for the CUG prior to its 
collapse in 2001-2002. After the “Rose Revolution,” in the parliamentary elections of March 
2004, their allegiance shifted to the bloc that represented the new government – the bloc 
‘National Movement – Democrats.’ However, the reason for the support given first to the CUG 
and later to the National Movement was clearly not related to the policies these two parties stood 
for, but to the fact that the parties represented the current authorities and had the backing of the 
President of Georgia. 
 
Opposition political parties have featured only if a certain well-known member of the local 
political elite broke with the authorities and attempted (usually unsuccessfully) to form an 
alternative power base. Thus, in 1995 a former police chief, Amiran Shubitidze, was elected as 
the independent member of parliament for the single-mandate seat of Marneuli and soon found 
himself in opposition to the governor of Kvemo Kartli, Levan Mamaladze. Shubitidze later 
joined the Popular (Sakhalkho) Faction in Parliament and in the 1998 local elections, the Popular 
Party gained 16.53% in Marneuli rayon and 17.57% in the city of Marneuli, according to official 
figures. Later, after the collapse of the CUG, Akhalverd Umbatov, the former Chairman of 
Marneuli rayon sakrebulo, joined Zurab Zhvania’s opposition “United Democrats” party and 
appeared on this party’s list in the (later discredited) November 2003 parliamentary elections. 
According to (probably unreliable) official figures (based on fifty eight out of fifty-nine 
precincts), this party finished in second place in Marneuli rayon in these elections with 9.73% of 
the vote (compared to 70.63% for the pro-government “For a New Georgia” bloc). Finally, in 
Tsalka – where direct interference in electoral procedures was somewhat less marked – the local 
businessman Aik Meltonyan won the single-mandate seat for the bloc “Industry Will Save 
Georgia” in November 2003. In all of these cases, votes were cast for specific individuals, not 
parties. 
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Social Organisations, NGOs and Media 
 
As mentioned above, Geyrat played a very significant role in the communal life of the Azeri 
population of Kvemo Kartli during the early 1990s and continued to play the role of a “bridge” 
between the state and the Azeri community during the Shevardnadze period. Geyrat’s leaders 
would often mediate in the event of a dispute between members of the Azeri community and the 
authorities. On occasions they would use their influence with the state authorities to secure the 
release of individuals who had been arrested unlawfully by the police. Nevertheless, at the same 
time, their proximity to the authorities undermined and weakened Geyrat, and provoked 
divisions from within the movement (see above). 
 
Following the “Rose Revolution,” these splits within Geyrat deepened still further. Some Geyrat 
activists pledged loyalty to the new authorities, while the leaders of the movement, Alibali 
Askerov and Zumrud Qurbanov, adopted a critical stance towards Mikheil Saakashvili’s 
government and vigorously opposed the new local authorities. Geyrat now has little or no 
influence with either the local or the national authorities. The fragmentation and 
“disenfranchisement” of Geyrat has led some local observers to comment that the organisation 
today consists of little more than Askerov and Qurbanov as individuals. Nevertheless, this may 
be overstating the case somewhat; the movement is still held in esteem by many local Azeris and 
its leaders retain close links with political and media circles in Baku. In May 2004, Geyrat lent 
its support to a demonstration in Marneuli that demanded the dismissal of Amiran Shubitidze 
(see above), who was acting gamgebeli of Marneuli rayon.17 
 
Another feature of Azeri society is the institution of the aksakals (literally “white beards”) – 
respected elders of the community whose traditional role was to mediate in disputes within the 
Azeri community and to help solve communal problems. Such figures also exist amongst other 
Turkic-speaking peoples of the former Soviet Union, for example in Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. 
In Kvemo Kartli, the definition of what constitutes an aksakal is rather vague and informal, 
especially today. Some claim that every family has its own aksakal, others claim that there are 
only one or two aksakals in any village. Some even describe the elected heads of community 
(temi) sakrebulos as aksakals, although most observers do not subscribe to this point of view. 
The majority of Azeri informants in Kvemo Kartli agree that aksakals must be independent of 
the authorities, that in a village there can be anywhere from one to fifteen aksakals and that 
                                               
17 BBC Monitoring Service, 24 May 2004, from a report by a private TV channel in Baku, Azad Azearbaycan (24 
May 2004). 
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aksakals normally settle problems that are domestic in nature (for example disputes involving the 
choice of a marriage partner) and generally have no relation to state matters. Aksakals are often 
educated people, such as schoolteachers, although sometimes they may not have formal 
education, but rather what one observer calls a “human education,” i.e. knowledge of the Islamic 
behavioural code, adat. In most cases, the position of aksakal is an informal one, although in 
some villages a rather more institutionalised “council of aksakals” exists. Some observers point 
to co-operation between aksakals and village gamgebelis in solving communal problems such as 
a lack of water for drinking or irrigation. On occasions, aksakals have been known to 
recommend to citizens who to vote for in local or national elections. In a very few villages 
aksakals are seen as having more influence than the official authorities of the village (i.e. the 
sakrebulo and the gamgebeli). However, this is the exception rather than the rule. 
 
The fact that village gamgebelis are sometimes described as aksakals may be attributed to a 
deliberate policy by the local and central authorities to undermine the institution of the aksakals. 
According to some sources, during Mamaladze’s period as governor attempts were made by the 
authorities either to “buy” aksakals by offering them land or other resources in exchange for 
their loyalty or to promote “parallel aksakals” whose loyalty could not be questioned. The 
general picture seems to be one of aksakals losing their authority over time both as a result of the 
authorities’ policy of “divide and rule” and because of the poor state of the local economy and 
infrastructure. As one observer points out, “aksakals can do very little while people are forced to 
carry water in buckets.” Therefore, one can generally say that while aksakals remain a feature of 
Azeri society in Kvemo Kartli, they enjoy significantly less authority than they once did and 
have little influence on state power. 
 
Formal non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are a new phenomenon in Kvemo Kartli due to 
the fact that the donor organisations that provide grants to NGOs have been more or less absent 
in the province until very recently (see below). Nevertheless, in the past two years there has been 
a surge of NGO activity, especially in Marneuli and Gardabani rayons. In early 2004, there were 
estimated to be around twenty-five registered NGOs in these two rayons, although only a 
minority of these are active grant-seekers. The most active and well-established NGO is 
probably the Union of Intercultural Cooperation in Kvemo Kartli Region – “Bridge,” founded in 
2000 to promote cross-cultural communication in Kvemo Kartli. Its aim is to bring together the 
different communities in Kvemo Kartli through civic education and youth work. Following the 
“Rose Revolution,” the director of “Bridge,” Ramin Bairamov, was appointed first deputy 
gamgebeli of Gardabani rayon. Another important NGO is the Union of Azeri Women of 
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Georgia (UAWG), also founded in 2000. UAWG has provided free legal advice to residents of 
Kvemo Kartli, as well as training on women’s rights and human rights more generally. It also 
provided pre-election training in villages in Kvemo Kartli prior to the January 2004 presidential 
elections and the repeat parliamentary elections held in March 2004. The NGO sector in Bolnisi, 
Dmanisi and Tsalka rayons remains very weak and has virtually no impact on the lives of 
members of national minorities living there. 
 
Three national NGOs also have influence in those parts of Kvemo Kartli in which national 
minorities are concentrated. The public movement “Multinational Georgia” has played a 
particularly important role by encouraging a network of NGOs in Kvemo Kartli with a view to 
enhancing their participation in the social and political life of Georgia. Both “Bridge” and 
UAWG are part of this network. CIPDD has also played a role by organising round table 
meetings in Kvemo Kartli and in Tbilisi that bring together representatives of national 
minorities, NGOs and political parties. The other national NGO that has been active in the 
province is the election monitoring group “Fair Elections.” It was as a result of complaints by 
“Fair Elections” that the results from several precincts in Kvemo Kartli were declared invalid 
due to violation of election procedures in March 2004. 
 
The local media in all five rayons is underdeveloped. Due to the language barrier, most members 
of national minorities have no access to the Georgian media, and there are no current projects to 
provide simultaneous translations of Georgian news programmes on local television channels as 
there are in Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda in Samtskhe-Javakheti.18 Due to the presence of a 
transmission mast in Azerbaijan close to the border with Georgia, many Azeri residents of 
Kvemo Kartli are able to receive television programmes from Azerbaijan. This link, while 
providing vital information to the Azeri population, reinforces their cultural isolation from the 
Georgian state. 
 
Several media outlets accessible to national minorities do exist, although they are frequently of 
poor quality and (in the case of newspapers) appear irregularly. These include the Marneuli-
based television channel “Algeti” (established under the initiative of the previous gamgebeli of 
Marneuli rayon, Gocha Loria, and virtually a mouthpiece of the local authorities), the Azeri-
language newspaper Gurjistan, and Geyrat’s own newspaper, which shares the same name as the 
organisation. 
                                               
18 See Jonathan Wheatley, “Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Javakheti Region of Georgia”. ECMI 
Working Paper No. 22 (September 2004) at www.ecmi.de/doc/public_papers.html. 
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Main Donors and Implementing Partners 
 
Until 2001 Kvemo Kartli was more or less ignored by international donor organisations. 
However, in the last three years several such organisations have established projects there. First 
and foremost among these is GTZ’s Food Security, Regional Co-operation and Stability 
Programme (FRCS), which operates in Marneuli and Gardabani rayons and which aims to 
promote sustainable food production, to enhance cross-border co-operation with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan (especially through trade), and to reduce conflict potential by building the capacity of 
civil society at local level. With this end in mind, GTZ has established revolving seed funds in 
rural areas, created business centres in Rustavi, Marneuli and Gardabani, and at the time of 
writing was establishing information points at the Red Bridge and Sadakhlo markets on the 
borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan, where traders will be able receive up-to-date information 
on who is buying and selling what, as well as current prices and customs regulations. They have 
also founded Community Unions that bring together community gamgebelis from one rayon, in 
which each gamgebeli presents a development project for his or her community and submits it to 
the Union which then itself decides whether to accept or reject the proposal on the basis of 
jointly agreed rules and criteria. This fosters not only co-operation, but also competition for the 
funds that GTZ make available. 
 
GTZ has had considerable success in establishing revolving seed and vegetable funds and these 
are now administered by independent farmers’ associations. The Community Unions, however, 
have faced certain “teething problems,” partly because of the somewhat arbitrary rules and 
criteria that the Unions have employed to assess proposals, and also because of the fact that in 
Marneuli rayon most community gamgebelis have been replaced (see above). Nevertheless, in 
Gardabani rayon in 2004, eight infrastructure projects were approved by the Community Union 
costing between 4,000 and 40,000 Georgian Lari. In Marneuli rayon, six projects were approved, 
although the selection procedure was carried out by GTZ themselves due to the inability of the 
Community Union to do so. 
 
Mercy Corps has also implemented infrastructure rehabilitation projects in Gardabani, Marneuli 
and Bolnisi rayons through community mobilisation initiatives. This work belongs to two major 
projects: the Georgia Community Mobilisation Initiative – East (E-GCMI) and the Community 
Investment Project – East (CIP-E). The former was launched in September 2000 and aimed to 
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promote community development in twenty rayons in eastern Georgia. From 2002, E-GCMI 
began work in Bolnisi and Marneuli rayons after opening an office in Bolnisi. By March 2004, 
E-GCMI had established six community initiative groups (CIGs) in each of the two rayons and 
had implemented twenty-four projects to rehabilitate the local infrastructure (thirteen in Marneuli 
rayon and eleven in Bolnisi rayon).19 CIP-E has focused on community mobilisation and 
infrastructure rehabilitation in villages that lie on the path of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. The 
project is funded by BP and is implemented by Mercy Corps in Marneuli and Gardabani rayons. 
CIP-E has carried out rehabilitation in those villages in Marneuli and Gardabani rayons that are 
affected by the pipeline. A parallel project, the Community Investment Project – West (CIP-W), 
also funded by BP but implemented by CARE, carries out community mobilisation and 
infrastructure rehabilitation in villages affected by the pipeline in Tsalka rayon. The question of 
payment of compensation to communities affected by the pipeline will be dealt with in the 
section below. 
 
Finally, as part of their human rights project “Inter-communal Centres for Youth – Georgia,” 
World Vision is attempting to establish youth centres in Bolnisi and Marneuli, and has recently 
opened an office in Marneuli. The aim is to unite young people from different ethnic groups in 
order to reduce the potential for the ethnicisation of socioeconomic conflicts. The project is 
funded by the European Commission (80%) and World Vision Germany (20%) and is 
implemented by the NGO Multinational Georgia (see above) and the Association for the 
Promotion of Rugby in Georgia. 
  
British Petroleum and the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline 
 
The decision to build a major oil pipeline through the territory of Georgia from the Azeri port of 
Baku to Ceyhan in Turkey was hailed as a landmark decision that would contribute enormously 
to the economic potential of Georgia. Such high expectations were also raised in the regions 
through which the pipeline would cross. However, the failure of the pipeline project to provide 
instant economic benefits has, in certain communities, given rise to a sense of disillusionment. 
Although some local labour was hired in the construction process, this was mainly confined to 
low-paid digging jobs and the impact of the project on the local economy was minimal. 
Moreover ecological costs were increasingly perceived by the local population as being too high; 
                                               
19 Mercy Corps Georgia, Georgia Field Study: Understanding the Legacy of Community Mobilization, available at 
http://www.mercycorps.org/pdfs/1092332405.pdf.  
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this refers not only to the potential economic costs in the event of an accident, but also to the 
effects of the dust produced during the digging process, which many observers claimed was 
detrimental to health and which was not covered by the compensation scheme of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company (BTC Co). Thus, inaccurate information that portrayed the 
pipeline as something of a panacea for all ills led inevitably to a degree of disappointment and 
even mistrust. 
 
However, the construction of the pipeline has had an enormous impact on communities living 
along its path. Many communities have benefited considerably both through the funding of 
infrastructure implemented by CARE and Mercy Corps (see above) and through the direct 
provision of compensation. At the same time, the new resources available have, on occasions, 
also given rise to conflict. 
 
In Marneuli and Gardabani rayons in 2003, the distribution of work places on the pipeline 
project was the cause of some discontent. Members of the Azeri community complained that 
local managers whose task was to hire workers for the construction process accepted bribes in 
exchange for employment and discriminated against ethnic Azeris in the selection process. In 
June 2003 a protest meeting was held in the village of Jandara in Gardabani rayon and 
subsequently more local Azeris were employed in the pipeline project. In Marneuli rayon, 
however, little changed as the majority of those employed were not even residents of the rayon.20 
 
The most thorny question, however, was that of compensation for land, and nowhere was it more 
so than in Tsalka rayon, where it coincided with a process of rapid migration both into and out of 
the rayon (see above). Above all, two ambiguities gave rise to conflict: first, of who was entitled 
to receive compensation (i.e. whether it should only be long-term residents or whether new 
settlers should be included), and second, the question of who should receive compensation for 
communal village land. In is worth looking at these two ambiguities in turn. 
 
BP has purchased a 44 metre corridor of land from villagers whose land plots lie along the 
pipeline’s path (with full compensation to the affected households) and also pays compensation 
to villages that lie within 2 km of the pipeline. However, compensation is only paid to 
inhabitants who are legally resident in these villages. This excludes most of Tsalka’s newly-
arrived migrants from Ajara and Svaneti, as in most cases these new arrivals have simply 
                                               
20 Information provided by the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. 
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occupied the abandoned Greek houses and have no legal claim to the dwellings. The problem is 
compounded by the fact that many of the original Greek inhabitants cannot be traced and 
therefore buying the property from them would be problematic. Although the government 
launched a scheme to buy the abandoned houses in the mid to late 1990s, this scheme came to 
nothing as a result of inefficiency and corruption. A further plan by Saakashvili’s government to 
buy the houses and distribute them among the newly-settled population was launched in the 
autumn of 2004 and it is clearly too early to judge the success of this scheme. 
 
However, this comes too late for claims for compensation from most new-arrivals. Although a 
few of the new settlers managed to buy the abandoned houses, most had neither the knowledge 
nor resources to do so. In the village of Avranlo, for example, where 160 Greek families live 
alongside around a hundred newly-arrived families from Ajara (most of whom have arrived in 
the past eighteen months), only the Greek inhabitants received compensation from BP. This has 
caused resentment amongst the new arrivals, who have become more assertive as their numbers 
have swelled. 
 
The second ambiguity – and potential source of conflict – stems from a lack of clarity in the 
Georgian legislation on the privatisation of land. Georgian law does not clearly establish the 
ownership of communal pasture land, stating instead that it belongs to the “village” (sopheli) – a 
term that is not defined by Georgian law. In most cases villagers come to an informal 
arrangement as to how this land is to be used and distribute it according to individual needs. 
 
However, BP’s intervention complicated this picture somewhat. BP agreed to pay compensation 
both to individual households whose land is intersected by the pipeline route and to communities 
whose pastures lie on the pipeline’s path. How this communal compensation was to be 
distributed amongst villagers remained unclear and was open to challenge. For example, 
villagers who had more livestock could claim that they needed more pastureland and were 
therefore entitled to more compensation. In many cases, the community gamgebeli was given the 
responsibility of distributing compensation for communal land, and in two communities in 
Tsalka rayon the gamgebeli abused his position by pocketing the compensation and leaving the 
country. 
 
The issue of community compensation also gave rise to conflict between original inhabitants and 
new settlers. Once again in the village of Avranlo, the Greek-dominated community-based 
organisation (CBO) that was in charge of distributing compensation for high mountain pastures 
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and hayfields decided not to award compensation to seven resettled families from Ajara. The 
families went to the district court to appeal – and won – but the CBO then launched a counter-
appeal.21  Thus, there is a situation in which the intervention of an outside actor (BP) combined 
with inadequate institutional arrangements in the host country increased the conflict potential at 
the village level. 
 
Foreign States 
 
Of all foreign states the one that has had the most influence over Kvemo Kartli province is 
Azerbaijan. The crucial factor for the Azeri population is the personal relationship that exists 
between the Presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Azeri population supported Eduard 
Shevardnadze because of his close relationship with Azerbaijan’s President, Heidar Aliyev. It is 
said that in presidential elections in Kvemo Kartli, local Azeris even looked for the name of 
Heidar Aliyev on the ballot paper.22 Although some analysts feared that the replacement of the 
president in both Georgia and Azerbaijan would weaken the “special relationship” between the 
two countries and lead to instability in Kvemo Kartli, the two new presidents moved quickly to 
cement their personal relationship. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili visited his new 
counterpart Ilham Aliyev in March 2004, describing Aliyev as his “brother,” and Aliyev returned 
the visit in June when he also went to Marneuli and received a horse as a gift from the new 
Georgian President. 
 
The main influence of Azerbaijan on society in Kvemo Kartli is cultural. As noted above, the 
population of much of Kvemo Kartli is able to receive television from Azerbaijan, which 
provides them with their main source of news. Moreover, local Azeris frequently cross over to 
Azerbaijan for purposes of trade, mainly in agricultural products – and especially to buy flour 
which is normally cheaper in Azerbaijan than in Georgia. Another symptom of the strong 
cultural bonds between the Azeri population in Kvemo Kartli and Baku is the fact that many 
Azeris from Kvemo Kartli come to Baku to attend certain important social events – the funeral 
of the former President of Azerbaijan, Heidar Aliyev, was a case in point. Finally, due to the 
language barrier, those young people who obtain a higher education are unable to obtain it in 
                                               
21 Georgia SRAP Expert Panel Review (February 2004), available at 
http://www.caspiandevelopmentandexport.com/Downloads/MediaLibrary/Download/79/Social%20and%20Resettle
ment%20Action%20Plan%20Review%20Part%20A.pdf. 
22 “Georgian Azeris Locked out by Language”. Source: Minelres Archive, 
http://lists.delfi.lv/pipermail/minelres/2004-February/003206.html, reproduced on http://www.us-
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Tbilisi and many of them therefore go to Baku. This practice was already widespread during the 
Soviet period and as a result many members of the local intelligentsia have relatives in 
Azerbaijan’s capital. Even members of ordinary families in Azeri villages in Kvemo Kartli often 
have relatives living in Azerbaijan, especially Baku. Most large villages in the Azeri-populated 
areas of Kvemo Kartli have a direct bus link with Baku and/or other major urban centres in 
Azerbaijan. Thus, there are many personal networks that extend across the Georgia-Azerbaijan 
border. 
 
Finally, the mass media in Azerbaijan sometimes airs the grievances of the Azeri population of 
Kvemo Kartli. During 2004, the Baku-based Russian language newspaper, Zerkalo, published 
complaints of harassment from certain sectors of the Azeri population in Kvemo Kartli and on 
occasions interviews the leaders of Geyrat. The newspaper has also referred to Kvemo Kartli by 
the Azeri name of Borchalo, a term that gives rise to a degree of unease amongst Georgians.23 
 
Following the death of an elderly Azeri woman in a land dispute over a horse farm in Marneuli 
rayon (see Section V below), some parts of the media in Azerbaijan covered the incident 
extensively and the tone of their reports was at times somewhat critical of the Georgian 
authorities. Demonstrators in Baku even handed over a protest letter to the Georgian embassy 
there to demand justice.24 Moreover, the fact that the Azeri ombudsman, Elmira Suleimanova, 
was sent to Tbilisi and to Marneuli to diffuse tensions in the aftermath of this incident shows 
how the Azeri government still has a vital role to play in the continuing stability of Kvemo Kartli 
province. 
 
Despite some cases of adverse publicity in Azerbaijan’s media, the government of Azerbaijan 
has made every effort to maintain a good relationship with Georgia and has, in general, done its 
utmost to avoid exploiting tensions in Kvemo Kartli. Azerbaijan also finds itself in a similar 
situation to Georgia in terms of the loss of its territorial integrity following the war in Nagorno 
Karabakh, and, like Georgia, often feels threatened by Russia’s desire to maintain its influence in 
the Caucasus. Its membership (together with Georgia) in the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) alliance as a counterbalance to Russian hegemony within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) reflects its geopolitical stance. 
                                                                                                                                                       
english.org/foundation/research/olp/viewResearch.asp?CID=58&TID=4, by Zaza Baazov, a freelance journalist 
based in Tbilisi, March 2002. 
23 “Azeris in Georgia Protest about Illegalities in Municipal Elections”, excerpt from A. Rsaidoglu’s in Zerkalo on 
30 May 2002 entitled “Georgian-style Elections”. Available at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/georgia/hypermail/200205/0082.shtml.  
24 BBC Monitoring Service, 9 December 2004, from ANS TV, Baku, in Azeri, 9 December 2004. 
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As well as through its often troubled relationship with Georgia, Russia also has direct influence 
over Kvemo Kartli, by acting as a magnet for would-be migrants from Kvemo Kartli, especially 
amongst members of the Azeri and Armenian communities who go to Russia for seasonal work 
or even emigrate permanently. As many of these migrants send remittances to their relatives in 
Georgia, Russia’s policy towards Georgia clearly has a crucial impact. In this respect, changes in 
the visa regime between Georgia and Russia may cause major disruption to the local economy. 
Such changes may also affect the trade of agricultural products between Kvemo Kartli and 
Russia. 
 
The Georgian State 
 
The policy of the Georgian state towards Kvemo Kartli during Shevardnadze’s term as President 
can best be characterised by the term “benign neglect.” The Georgian state established control 
over national minorities in the province by means of patron-client linkages and made few efforts 
to integrate the non-Georgian population with the rest of the country in any meaningful way. 
While outwardly espousing the need for all citizens to know Georgian, the Georgian government 
at the same time took advantage of minorities’ poor knowledge of both the language and their 
own civil rights in order to deliver the required number of votes to the incumbent President and 
to the dominant party, the Citizens’ Union of Georgia. While avoiding direct methods of control 
over the non-Georgian population, the Georgian authorities skilfully manipulated the patron-
client relationships that had been established so as to weaken any independent centres of power. 
In this way both the public movement Geyrat and the institution of the aksakals were rendered 
pliant and lost the ability to challenge the government in any meaningful way. The 
powerlessness of these “home grown” institutions was reinforced by the desperate economic 
situation; the lack of independent resources inhibited the development of any meaningful form of 
civil society at the local level. The Georgian government appeared to lack not only a coherent 
policy as to how to integrate national minorities in Kvemo Kartli, but also any notion as to how 
to revive the province’s economy. 
 
Since the “Rose Revolution”, the new government has worked hard to limit the influence of the 
old patronage networks in Kvemo Kartli. Considerable effort has been spent in removing the last 
vestiges of Levan Mamaladze’s power structures in the province, and this zealous campaign has 
been carried out in Marneuli rayon in particular. However, while the old patron-client system 
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may not have benefited the non-Georgian communities in the long run as “clients” gradually 
became servants of the state and ceased representing their communities, it was still one (albeit 
weak) link between the non-Georgian population and the authorities. It is therefore the challenge 
of the new government to replace this system with a new mechanism in which national 
minorities are able to express their “voice” within the framework of institutions based on 
democracy and the rule of law. Failure to develop such a mechanism will inevitably lead to the 
re-emergence of patron-client ties and will further delay the social, cultural and economic 
development of the province. In addition, the new government needs to elaborate a strategy to 
both revive the economy of the province and integrate the non-Georgian population in a realistic, 
step-by-step manner. 
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V. The View From the Local Population: Priorities and Grievances 
 
Members of national minorities in Kvemo Kartli often voice concerns relating to socioeconomic 
and infrastructural matters but tend to be reluctant to voice complaints about ethno-political and 
cultural matters. Representatives of national minorities who hold positions in the local 
administrations often give the impression that there are no ethnic or cultural problems at all. 
However, respondents who do not belong to state structures and feel that they can express their 
feelings more openly often voice harsh criticism of the attitude of the national government or the 
local authorities towards national minorities. This feeling is expressed most vehemently amongst 
ethnic Azeris in Marneuli and Bolnisi rayons. Presented below are the priorities and grievances 
expressed by members of local elites and ordinary citizens from all ethnic communities both to 
the author of this report and to the Georgian and Azeri press in Marneuli, Gardabani, Bolnisi, 
Dmanisi and Tsalka rayons. Although these priorities are divided into two categories – 
economic/infrastructural and political/cultural – these two categories overlap, especially with 
regard to the sensitive question of land use. 
 
Economic/Infrastructural Priorities 
 
The main economic and infrastructural priorities and grievances listed by respondents from 
Kvemo Kartli relate to the high level of unemployment, the poor quality of the roads, the parlous 
state of industrial production, schools and medical facilities, the irregular supply of water for 
drinking and irrigation, shortages of electricity, and problems over land distribution. Of the 
fourteen infrastructure projects approved by GTZ in Gardabani and Marneuli rayons (see above), 
and which reflected the priorities of the inhabitants, three involved the rehabilitation of water 
supplies, three for school repairs, two for road repairs, two for garbage collection, two for the 
construction of a gas pipeline, one for construction of a medical centre, and one for telephones 
for sakrebulo offices25.  
 
Probably the most commonly voiced concern is the lack of water for drinking and irrigation. 
Very few homes in rural areas are connected to water pipes, and most villagers relay on natural 
sources of water, such as wells. This often has a negative affect on their health. Even those who 
do receive piped water receive it very intermittently. A focus group from the village of Kvemo 
                                               
25 Information provided by GTZ consultants. 
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Kharaba in Tsalka rayon, mainly inhabited by new settlers from the Khulo district of Ajara, 
complained that their only source of water was a spring one kilometre from the village and that 
this source was frequently contaminated and caused ill health. Water for irrigation is also a major 
problem as non-irrigated land is almost worthless. According to a member of Gardabani 
sakrebulo, there is high competition for well-irrigated land near to the irrigation canal but almost 
no demand for the poorly irrigated land. According to the Levan Noniashvili, former deputy 
gamgebeli of Dmanisi rayon, in rural areas of the rayon there is no water for irrigation at all, 
except in those few villages that are situated close to a lake. 
 
Electricity is also a major concern amongst the population of Kvemo Kartli. At the time the 
interviews were carried out, the inhabitants of most districts would receive around six hours of 
electricity per day. Respondents complained that the situation is considerably worse than this in 
winter. Although the supply of electricity appears to be no worse in Kvemo Kartli than in the rest 
of rural Georgia, the situation remains unacceptable, especially in the upland areas where winters 
are cold and harsh. 
 
The state of the roads – another widely-articulated grievance amongst the local population – is 
similar in most of Kvemo Kartli to other areas of Georgia. However, in Tsalka rayon the roads 
are especially bad. The only road that is in an acceptable state is that built by BTC from Tsalka 
to Tetritskaro. This road was built primarily for the use of those working for BTC, although local 
residents also use it. The old road from Tsalka to Tetritskaro, as well as the roads to Tbilisi and 
Ninotsminda are no more than dirt tracks that can only be navigated by a four-wheel drive 
vehicle and only then when weather conditions are not too harsh. The roads to remote villages in 
Tsalka rayon are in an even worse state. Another road that is in urgent need of repair is the road 
from Marneuli to the Red Bridge on the border with Azerbaijan – repairs to this road are a 
particularly pressing need given its role as a corridor for trade with Azerbaijan. 
 
Basic facilities are lacking in most villages, especially in upland areas. Most villages have no 
health centre, no cultural facilities, no library and no kindergarten. Most village schools are in 
very poor condition. In the words of one new settler from Ajara, presently living in a village in 
Tsalka rayon, “life is worse than where we came from.” It is possible that the situation in which 
Greek inhabitants find themselves in the villages of Tsalka rayon is even harder, as many, if not 
most, Greeks are past retirement age, find it harder to work the land, and are more prone to the 
cold and to ill health. In addition, they feel threatened by the new settlers (see below). 
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Lack of access to agricultural land is another very common complaint, particularly among Azeri 
respondents. There are two main sources of grievance: the lack of good land and the perception 
that land has been distributed unfairly. The first grievance is inextricably linked with problems 
relating to irrigation, described above. Good land is well-irrigated land and this is a scarce 
resource. 
 
As to complaints regarding the distribution of land, these complaints are most commonly voiced 
amongst the Azeri population in Marneuli rayon and Bolnisi rayon. The main complaint is 
directed towards wealthy individuals, mainly Georgians, often from other regions of Georgia, 
who make large profits by sub-letting land to local residents, often on the basis of a 49-year 
lease. This has given rise to a considerable degree of resentment as well as a feeling that Azeris 
have been unfairly deprived of land. As has been mentioned in Part II, many Azeris living near 
the border received disproportionately smaller plots than other rural inhabitants of Georgia 
during the privatisation process. Many respondents demanded that the land presently under lease 
be redistributed amongst the local population. 
 
Frustration over land distribution broke out into the open in December 2004 when local residents 
in the village of Kulari, in Marneuli rayon, staged a protest meeting demanding land belonging 
to a 1,155 acre horse farm, currently leased by the Tbilisi-based Jockey Club. The demonstrators, 
who had gathered around the farm, were fired upon by unknown assailants and a 65-year-old 
Azeri woman was killed. This provoked widespread anger amongst the Azeri population of 
Kvemo Kartli, who accused the management of the farm of firing at peaceful protestors. The 
dismissal of Ioseb Mazmishvili (see Section II above) was, at least in part, precipitated by this 
incident.26 
 
Another demand that was voiced amongst rural inhabitants was the need for credit to revive local 
agriculture. According to some respondents, three or four years’ credit would help buy farm 
machinery or establish a mini-factory to process agricultural products. Respondents asserted that 
they would be able to repay all loans within the space of a few years. However, they complained 
that no banks or credit organisations were prepared to give micro-credit to rural areas. CARE’s 
representative in Tsalka stated that even the credit organisation CONSTANTA, a partner of 
CARE, does not work in Tsalka rayon. 
 
                                               
26 Sofo Bukia, “Azeris Angry Over Georgia Killing”, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, No. 266, December 16, 
2004 at www.iwpr.net. 
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Some respondents complained of difficulties faced by the local population when engaging in 
trade, especially to Azerbaijan. Buying and selling products in Azerbaijan has, in recent times, 
always involved the payment of bribes. However, according to several respondents, since a 
crackdown on contraband trade on the Red Bridge (on the border of Georgia and Azerbaijan) in 
May-June 2004, the situation has become considerably worse. The effect of the crackdown, they 
claim, was not to eliminate the payment of bribes, but merely to push up the size of the bribe that 
had to be paid. 
 
Finally, several respondents complained about the lack of international organisations (IOs) 
operating in Kvemo Kartli. One NGO leader mentioned the fact that there was far more 
involvement by IOs in the Armenian-populated areas of Javakheti than in Kvemo Kartli. 
Respondents stressed the need for IOs to become more involved in those parts of Kvemo Kartli 
that are inhabited by national minorities and recommended that they establish offices in Kvemo 
Kartli. 
 
Political/Cultural Priorities 
 
Aside from economic and infrastructural problems, the problem that seems to be the subject of 
most discussion amongst representatives of national minorities in Kvemo Kartli is the language 
barrier. Representatives of both governmental structures and NGOs expressed great concern 
about the isolation of the Azeri community both from the Georgian state and from Georgian 
society. The two most widely expressed concerns related to the information vacuum that most 
Azeris experience, and to the lack of a common language between young Azeris and young 
Georgians. 
 
The only language used in government offices and in most of the media in Georgia is Georgian. 
At the same time most members of national minorities who live outside Tbilisi are unable to 
speak this language. According to representatives of national minorities living in Kvemo Kartli, 
this leads to two very undesirable consequences. First, as mentioned earlier, most Azeris, 
Armenians and Greeks who live in Kvemo Kartli are unable to understand the Georgian media. 
They therefore only receive information about what is going on in Georgia through Russian or 
Azeri media. Second, they are unable to understand Georgian laws, are unable to make full use 
of the Georgian legal system (as the language used in the courts is Georgian), and are mostly 
unaware of their rights and responsibilities as citizens of Georgia. 
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As to the possibility of cultural exchange and communication between members of national 
minorities and the Georgian population in Kvemo Kartli, this is extremely limited as a result of 
the language barrier and because most villages are mono-ethnic (see the Appendix). It is 
especially limited amongst young people from all communities, who often do not know Russian. 
There is a real danger that the new generation in Kvemo Kartli will live in total isolation from – 
and in total ignorance of – other ethnic communities. 
 
Almost all respondents of all nationalities who mentioned the language barrier agreed that it was 
desirable for members of national minorities to learn Georgian. There were several complaints 
that so far the teaching of Georgian to national minorities in Kvemo Kartli had been purely 
symbolic. Some (Azeri) respondents who were not a part of official state structures expressed 
unease at suggestions that the Georgian government may attempt to ensure that teaching in all 
schools be carried out in Georgian within the next few years. The general view was that this was 
unrealistic, and one Azeri respondent voiced concerns both about the threat of assimilation and 
about the risk that a lack of knowledge of the Georgian language would be used as an excuse to 
dismiss teachers and other state servants from their jobs. Several respondents stressed the need 
for a careful and well-thought out programme of teaching Georgian to be implemented over a 
period of at least ten years. As to the information vacuum, one respondent asked why there was 
no project for the simultaneous translation of TV news from Georgian into Azeri, when such a 
project already existed in Javakheti, where news programmes are translated from Georgian into 
Armenian.27 Another respondent stressed the need to translate legal texts into Azeri, or at the 
very least into Russian. 
 
Another complaint voiced by Azeri respondents from Marneuli rayon who were not working for 
state structures related to the appointment of staff to the local bureaucracy. The complaint was 
that Azeris were underrepresented in local bureaucratic structures. An additional complaint was 
that many of those who work in local power structures at the rayon level – irrespective of their 
ethnicity – are from outside the rayon, typically from Tbilisi or Rustavi. One respondent 
complained that in Marneuli rayon there were more Svans working in state structures than 
Azeris, despite the fact that the Azeri population of Marneuli rayon was over 100,000 while 
there were only around 1,000 Svans. The fact that these complaints were voiced most strongly in 
                                               
27 Here he was referring to the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention and Integration Programme. Within this programme and 
with the assistance of the news agency Internews, two local television studios in Javakheti have provided 
simultaneous translation into Armenian of two Georgian news programmes. 
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Marneuli rayon was likely the result of the resignation (some would say “forced resignation”) of 
eleven community (temi) gamgebelis there, which was perceived by some as evidence of an anti-
Azeri bias (see Section IV above). In relation to these events, several respondents expressed the 
desire for genuine local self-government, including direct elections for gamgebelis, arguing that 
the present system was a mere façade for local self-government. 
 
There were also a few complaints of criminal acts committed by Svan settlers against members 
of national minorities. On several occasions mention was made of an incident in February 2004 
in which an ethnic Azeri was murdered by a Svan in Dmanisi rayon. However, according to one 
(Azeri) respondent from Dmanisi rayon, the murder was the result of a personal dispute between 
former friends and the ethnic identity of perpetrator and victim were not relevant. This incident 
demonstrates how easily conflicts of an everyday nature can be (wrongly) interpreted as ethnic 
conflicts and how this can lead to suspicion and mistrust between communities when there is a 
lack of genuine inter-communal dialogue. The danger of misinterpreting ordinary conflicts as 
ethnic conflicts was highlighted by several respondents. 
 
Inter-communal grievances were most commonly expressed in Tsalka rayon, where rapid out-
migration and in-migration have led to radical changes in the demographic balance of the rayon 
and the resulting struggle for scarce resources has been complicated by the pipeline project (see 
above). Typically conflicts have broken out between the original inhabitants (mainly Greeks and 
Armenians) and the newcomers (Georgians from Ajara and Svans). In 2004, two incidents of 
violence were recorded between Georgians and Armenians in Tsalka rayon – one following a 
drunken argument at a wedding and another after a football match. The Greek community feels 
particularly under pressure as most are elderly and unprotected, and therefore feel threatened by 
the influx of newcomers. Elderly Greek residents in one village claimed that new settlers from 
Atchara had been occupying their houses, stealing their land and livestock and even physically 
assaulting them. Their claims could not be corroborated. 
 
Another grievance connected with ethnic identity concerns place names (toponyms). In Bolnisi 
rayon, several respondents expressed strong dissatisfaction with the fact that the names of their 
villages had been changed from their original Azeri names to Georgian names. Apparently this 
had happened in the early 1990s when Gamsakhurdia was President. One respondent even 
claimed that his elderly father had been forced to change the name of his village of birth on his 
passport so that it conformed to the new (Georgianised) name. The same respondent recalled 
how, in 1999, the sakrebulo (council) in one Azeri village had passed a motion demanding that 
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the name of a village be changed back to its former (Azeri) name. After 20 days, he claims, the 
decision was annulled by the authorities. 
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VI Summary and Recommendations for ECMI 
 
There is a potential for conflict in Kvemo Kartli and the two main foci for potential conflict are 
perceived discrimination against the Azeri community in Marneuli and Bolnisi rayons and the 
struggle for resources between original inhabitants and newcomers in Tsalka rayon. The first of 
these two potential conflicts has both political and socio-economic aspects, while the second is 
mainly socio-economic. 
 
The fact that the Armenian population of Javakheti expresses its discontent much more openly 
than the Azeri population of Kvemo Kartli often leads observers to categorise Javakheti as a 
potential “trouble spot” and at the same time to neglect the underlying tensions in Kvemo Kartli. 
Generally speaking, Azeris in Kvemo Kartli do not express their grievances openly. Any protest, 
when it occurs, is characterised by a short emotional explosion in response to a particular event 
and is normally over in the space of a couple of hours. However, conflict avoidance – the failure 
to address potential sources of conflict and to find solutions to problems that may cause discord 
– does little to prevent conflict in the medium to long term. As we have seen in this report, many 
Azeris in Kvemo Kartli, especially members of the intelligentsia in Marneuli and Bolnisi rayons, 
feel that they are treated as second class citizens both in terms of representation in local power 
structures, and in terms of access to resources (especially good quality land). At present, there 
are no signs that the “latent conflict” that exists will become active as there is no outside 
“agitator” in either Georgia or Azerbaijan prepared to exploit the grievances of Georgia’s Azeris. 
However, changes in the outside environment at some time in the future – particularly in the 
political structure of Azerbaijan – could conceivably provide a fuse that could turn this conflict 
into one that is expressed more openly or even violently. 
 
As well as political problems, there are also serious socio-economic problems that are common 
to most of Georgia. However, in Tsalka rayon, where economic problems are particularly serious 
and where the local infrastructure is more degraded than elsewhere, large-scale migration 
processes and the consequent competition for land and other resources have led to conflict 
between original inhabitants and new settlers. One lesson to be drawn from Tsalka is that 
intervention from outside, even if motivated by good intentions, can increase rather than reduce 
the potential for conflict, as BTC’s compensation programme has demonstrated. 
 
To date, as we have seen, there has been little activity by international organisations in Kvemo 
Kartli province. There is an urgent need for action, providing it is carefully planned and well 
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thought out. It is therefore highly recommended that ECMI work in Kvemo Kartli. Having 
already opened an office in Akhalkalaki and having begun working with the mainly Armenian 
population of Javakheti, ECMI may damage its image if it fails to engage with the (marginally 
more numerous) Azeri population.28 As I explained in the previous paragraph, the needs of all 
national minorities in Kvemo Kartli are just as great as those of the population of Javakheti. 
 
As to the role an international organisation such as ECMI could play, there is great need for a 
mechanism to establish a flow of reliable information from the rayons of Kvemo Kartli to the 
centre. One problem with Kvemo Kartli is that the administrative centre of the province, the city 
of Rustavi, is situated just 25km from Tbilisi and therefore many of those who administer the 
province are either from Rustavi itself or from Tbilisi and have little idea of what is going on in 
the villages. In addition, there is a Georgian stereotype of Azeris as slow-witted and passive, 
which leads many to believe that either the Azeri population has no grievances at all, or that 
those grievances are not to be taken seriously. By establishing a dialogue between citizens of all 
ethnic groups from Kvemo Kartli and decision-makers in Tbilisi, it may be possible to combat 
such stereotypes and provide the Georgian government with reliable information around which 
to formulate policy. 
 
The need for a mechanism to voice one’s concerns and fears is particularly pressing for the 
elderly Greek inhabitants of Tsalka rayon, who feel that their way of life is increasingly 
threatened. The lack of community leaders who can mediate with the authorities makes the 
position of rural Greek communities particularly vulnerable. The Greek population of Tsalka has 
been reduced dramatically in the last fifteen years and there is a real risk that those who remain 
will also leave. There is also a need to provide assistance to the Georgian government in 
regulating the flow of newcomers into Tsalka rayon and to provide them with housing in a 
controlled and legal manner. 
 
Considerable work is needed to integrate the various communities in Kvemo Kartli, especially to 
develop contacts between young people from different ethnic communities. Any such initiative 
should involve co-operation with World Vision, who have already begun work in this direction 
in Marneuli and Bolnisi rayons. There is also room for a project that is already underway in 
Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda rayons – that of providing simultaneous translation of Georgian 
news programmes on local television. Possibly such a project could draw on the experience 
                                               
28 According to the 2002 population survey, Azeris make up 6.51% of Georgia’s population, while Armenians make 
up 5.69%. 
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already gathered by the OSCE/Internews project in Javakheti. Another direction that should be 
explored is the possibility of translating relevant Georgian laws into Russian or Azeri and 
making available to the non-Georgian population of Kvemo Kartli translations of laws that 
already exist. 
 
There is also considerable scope for assistance in developing economic opportunities for the 
province. Much of the land in Kvemo Kartli is extremely fertile and there is real potential to 
develop the agricultural sector. One step that may significantly promote development in this 
direction is access to credit for rural communities in order for local farmers to buy functional 
machinery. In this respect, it would be highly desirable to kindle the interest of banks and credit 
organisations and encourage them to provide loans to Kvemo Kartli’s small farmers and 
growers. 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF VILLAGES IN THE FIVE RAYONS 
 
Below are listed data from the 2002 Census concerning all villages in the five rayons about 
which this report is concerned. As the published version of the Census does not provide the 
breakdown of the population of the rayon centres in terms of ethnic groups, the figures given for 
these cities have been extrapolated from general data on the population of rayons and village-by-
village data from rural areas. 
 
RAYON/SAKREBULO TOWN/VILLAGE POPULATION ETHNICITY 
Bolnisi rayon    
Bolnisi City Bolnisi 17650 82% Georgian 
8% Armenian 
5% Azeri 
2% Russian 
2% Greek 
Tamarisi Town Pharizi 1205 98% Azeri 
 Tsurtavi 2319 98% Azeri 
Kazreti Town Balitchi 1023 96% Georgian 
Akaurti Community Akaurti 1174 85% Azeri 
 Bertakari 289 100%Azeri 
 Geta 698 99% Azeri 
 Itsria 249 100% Azeri 
 Senebi 157 96% Azeri 
 Photskhveriani 724 98% Azeri 
 Dzedzvnariani 779 98% Azeri 
 Dzveli Kveshi 2183 98% Azeri 
Bolnisi Community Bolnisi village 2333 90% Armenian 
 Samtsevrisi 361 90% Azeri 
 Pholadauri 495 63% Azeri 
18% Georgian 
16% Russian 
 Shua Bolnisi 618 100% Azeri 
Darbazi Community Darbazi 3743 98% Azeri 
 Tsiphori 522 97% Azeri 
 Tchreshi 181 97% Azeri 
 Khakhalajvari 359 98% Azeri 
Mamkhuti Community Mamkhuti 2841 100% Azeri 
 Zemo Arkevani 604 96% Azeri 
 Kvemo Arkevani 1053 99% Azeri 
 Khataveti 192 100% Azeri 
Nakhiduri Community Nakhiduri 4876 100% Azeri 
 Balakhauri 502 100% Azeri 
 Mukhrani 893 100% Azeri 
 Mtsqneti 286 100% Azeri 
 Tchapali 1623 100% Azeri 
 Khidisquri 846 99% Azeri 
Ratevani Community Ratevani 1582 96% Georgian 
 Zvareti 501 99% Azeri 
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Ratchisubani Comm. Ratchisubani 795 98% Georgian 
 Vanati 530 96% Azeri 
 Samtredo 541 97% Azeri 
 Khatissopheli 480 98% Georgian 
Talaveri Community Talaveri 6891 99% Azeri 
 Patara Darbazi 40 100% Azeri 
 Savaneti 1717 98% Azeri 
Tandzia Village Tandzia 613 99% Georgian 
Kvemo Bolnisi Village Kvemo Bolnisi 6766 100% Azeri 
Kveshi Community Kveshi 440 92% Georgian 
 Kianeti 492 96% Armenian 
 Mushevani 1194 100% Azeri 
 Sabereti 112 100% Azeri 
 Javshaniani 829 99% Azeri 
Gardabani Rayon    
Gardabani City Gardabani 16145 47% Georgian 
44% Azeri 
2% Armenian 
2% Russian 
1% Greek 
Didi Lilo Town Varketili 2932 93% Georgian 
 Nasaguri 1409 82% Georgian 
 Patara Lilo 663 100% Georgian 
 Tsinubani 1189 98% Georgian 
Kojori Town Dideba 175 97% Georgian 
 Kveseti 12 100% Georgian 
 Kiketi 173 92% Georgian 
 Samadlo 17 100% Georgian 
Aghtakla Community Aghtakla 4229 93% Azeri 
Qaratakla Community Qaratakla 2936 98% Azeri 
Qarajalari Community Qarajalari 4141 98% Azeri 
Akhali Samgori Village Akhali Samgori 2223 98% Georgian 
Akhalsopheli Comm. Akhalsopheli 1827 98% Georgian 
 Mukhrovani 618 84% Georgian 
 Satskhenisi 565 99% Georgian 
Gamarjveba Village Gamarjveba 5282 97% Georgian 
Vakhtangisi Village Vakhtangisi 2592 90% Azeri 
Teleti Community Zemo Teleti 847 99% Georgian 
 Akhaltsqaro 487 97% Georgian 
 Mukhran-Teleti 93 100% Georgian 
 Kvemo Teleti 798 98% Georgian 
 Tsalasquri 561 98% Georgian 
Kalinino Community Kalinino 1156 94% Azeri 
 Ambartaphi 131 81% Azeri 
13% Georgian 
 Akhalsheni 1184 87% Azeri 
 Birliki 1655 98% Azeri 
 Tazakendi 1856 98% Azeri 
Krtsanisi Village Krtsanisi 2560 87% Georgian 
Kumisi Village Kumisi 2182 97% Georgian 
Lemshveniera Comm. Lemshveniera 1931 98% Georgian 
 Mzianeti 413 96% Georgian 
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 Nagebi 481 91% Georgian 
Martqophi Community Martqophi 7666 99% Georgian 
 Vaziani 2694 79% Georgian 
11% Azeri 
 Saakadze 286 76% Georgian 
12% Greek 
Nazarlo Village Nazarlo 5808 97% Azeri 
Norio Community Norio 3968 99% Georgian 
 Kvishiani 285 92% Georgian 
 Tsitelubani 373 91% Georgian 
Sartitchala Community Sartitchala 7041 90% Georgian 
 Mughanlo 3558 99% Azeri 
Tabakhmela Community Tabakhmela 2036 97% Georgian 
 Shindisi 1543 99% Georgian 
 Tsavkisi 1199 99% Georgian 
Phonitchala Village Phonitchala 5698 89% Azeri 
Kesalo Village Kesalo 5612 98% Azeri 
Jandara Village Jandara 3118 97% Azeri 
Dmanisi Rayon    
Dmanisi City Dmanisi 3427 82% Georgian 
12% Azeri 
3% Russian 
2% Armenian 
1% Greek 
Amamlo Community Amamlo 1596 97% Azeris 
 Angrevani 162 98% Azeri 
 Bezaklo 763 97% Azeri 
 Mamishlo 908 99% Azeri 
 Sapharlo 738 99% Azeri 
 Tqispiri 53 98% Azeri 
Gantiadi Community Gantiadi 816 96% Georgian 
 Tnusi 454 100% Azeri 
 Javakhi 628 97% Georgian 
Gomareti Community Didi Gomareti 802 97% Georgian 
 Mamula 80 99% Georgian 
 Pantiani 11 100% Georgian 
 Patara Gomareti 174 97% Georgian 
 Chitakhi 79 99% Georgian 
Guguti Community Guguti 178 99% Georgian 
 Kamisho 355 99% Azeri 
 Lokjandari 258 100% Azeri 
Didi Dmanisi Comm. Didi Dmanisi 871 96% Georgian 
 Boslebi 667 98% Georgian 
 Vardisubani 403 98% Georgian 
 Patara Dmanisi 169 97% Georgian 
Dmanisi Community Iaqublo 498 99% Azeri 
 Pantiani 410 99% Azeri 
 Shindiliari 467 100% Azeri 
Irganchai Village Irganchai 2678 97% Azeri 
Kamarlo Community Kamarlo 713 100% Azeri 
 Kariani 108 98% Azeri 
 Shakhmarlo 341 100% Azeri 
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Kirovisi Community Kirovisi 481 96% Azeri 
 Bakhchalari 149 100% Azeri 
 Dagarakhlo 711 100% Azeri 
 Ormasheni 206 100% Azeri 
 Saja 106 100% Azeri 
 Qazilajlo 341 100% Azeri 
Mashavera Community Mashavera 864 97% Georgian 
 Ukangori 10 80% Georgian 
Sakire Village Sakire 49 41% Greek 
37% Azeri 
 Gora 38 47% Azeri 
47% Greek 
Sarkineti Community Sarkineti 63 43% Georgian 
41% Greek 
 Ganakhleba 33 42% Greek 
36% Georgian 
 Velispiri 64 56% Georgian 
31% Greeks 
Kv. Orozmani Comm. Kvemo Orozmani 660 99% Azeri 
 Dalari 313 100% Azeri 
 Vake 317 90% Azeri 
 Zemo Orozmani 901 100% Azeri 
 Mtisdziri 243 98% Azeri 
Qarabulaghi Comm. Zemo Qarabulaghi 1114 99% Azeri 
 Akha 93 99% Georgian 
 Gedagdaghi 362 100% Azeri 
 Mamishlari 102 100% Azeri 
 Salamaleiki 98 100% Azeri 
 Soghutlo 27 100% Azeri 
 Useinkendi 135 100% Azeri 
 Kvemo Qarabulaghi 333 100% Azeri 
Qizilkilisi Qizilkilisi 774 99% Azeri 
 Kakliani 640 100% Azeri 
Marneuli Rayon    
Marneuli City Marneuli 23695 70% Azeri 
19% Azeri 
9% Georgian 
1% Russian 
1% Greek 
Shaumiani Town Akhqula 150 99% Azeri 
 Qudro 43 100% Armenian 
 Khikhani 304 100% Georgian 
Algeti Community Algeti 5017 99% Azeri 
 Azizkendi 2170 100% Azeri 
 Ajiiskendi 750 100% Azeri 
 Tazakendi 2230 100% Azeri 
 Sabirkendi 3713 100% Azeri 
Akhkerphi Community Akhkerphi 742 96% Armenian 
 Chanakhchi 235 100% Armenian 
Damia-Giaurarkhi Com. Damia-Giaurarkhi 1815 100% Azeri 
 Akhlo Lalalo 805 100% Azeri 
 Damia 334 100% Armenian 
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 Kirovki 706 98% Azeri 
Tamarisi Community Tamarisi 1690 88% Georgian 
 Alavari 288 97% Azeri 
 Akhali Dioknisi 296 100% Georgian 
Kasumlo Community Kasumlo 2921 99% Azeri 
 Aghmamedlo 2867 100% Azeri 
 Baitalo 400 100% Azeri 
 Beitaraphchi 483 100% Azeri 
 Kushchi 452 99% Azeri 
 Ulashlo 859 100% Azeri 
Ophreti Community Ophreti 158 78% Greek 
9% Georgian 
8% Russian 
 Khokhmeli 81 95% Armenian 
Sadakhlo Community Sadakhlo 9486 97% Azeri 
 Burma 200 91% Azeri 
 Tazakendi 433 99% Azeri 
 Molaoghli 1180 100% Azeri 
Kapanakhchi Comm. Kapanakhchi 1383 100% Azeri 
 Ambarovka 1249 96% Azeri 
 Ilmazlo 1033 100% Azeri 
 Meore Kesalo 1587 100% Azeri 
 Pirveli Kesalo 1622 100% Azeri 
 Keshalo 3322 100% Azeri 
Kurtlari Community Kurtlari 1711 100% Azeri 
 Baidari 1236 100% Azeri 
 Didi Mughanlo 1815 100% Azeri 
 Lezhbadini 1538 100% Azeri 
 Khutor-Lezhbadini 177 100% Azeri 
Qachaghani Comm. Qachaghani 3974 98% Azeri 
 Tekali 1682 97% Azeri 
 Karach-Mughanlo 1155 99% Azeri 
 Khanji-Gazlo 436 99% Azeri 
Qizil-Ajlo Community Qizil-Ajlo 7124 98% Azeri 
Qulari Community Kvemo Qulari 628 96% Azeri 
 Budionovka 163 55% Armenian 
34% Azeri 
 Dashtapha 1462 97% Azeri 
 Zemo Qulari 1704 98% Azeri 
 Kirikhlo 1262 100% Azeri 
 Qirmizkendi 1072 78% Armenian 
19% Georgian 
Shulaveri Community Shulaveri 1787 53% Azeri 
23% Russian 
21% Georgian 
 Araphlo 1118 100% Azeri 
 Akhali Mamudlo 758 99% Azeri 
 Enikendi 492 100% Azeri 
 Zemo Sarali 1135 100% Azeri 
 Imiri 1445 93% Azeri 
 Seidkhojalo 527 100% Azeri 
 Kvemo Sarali 1745 99% Azeri 
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Tserakvi Community Tserakvi 248 Not available 
 Sioni 351 62% Georgian 
33% Armenian 
 Jankhoshi 20 55% Georgian 
40% Azeri 
Tsereteli Community Tsereteli 2206 89% Georgian 
 Orjonikidze 1470 99% Georgian 
 Didi Beglari 200 100% Azeri 
 Norgiughi 567 63% Armenian 
22% Azeri 
 Patara Beglari 395 100% Azeri 
Khojorni Community Khojorni 842 78% Armenian 
21% Azeri 
 Burdadzori 58 91% Armenian 
 Gulbaghi 273 99% Armenian 
 Tsopi 746 62% Azeri 
34% Armenian 
Tsalka Rayon    
Tsalka City Tsalka 2411 59% Greek 
23% Georgian 
11% Armenian 
2% Russian 
1% Azeri 
Bediani Town Khamhesi 118 39% Armenian 
34% Greek 
20% Georgian 
Trialeti Town Chapaevka 88 93% Georgian 
Avranlo Community Avranlo 717 81% Greek 
 Tarsoni 9 78% Azeri 
22% Georgian 
Arjevan-Sarvani Comm. Arjevan-Sarvani 794 99% Azeri 
 Gedaklari 73 100% Azeri 
 Cholmani 295 99% Azeri 
Ashkala Village Ashkala 2043 99% Armenian 
Akhaliki Community Akhaliki 112 71% Greek 
14% Russian 
 Kvemo Kharaba 303 91% Georgian 
 Shipiaki 35 89% Greek 
Bashkoi Community Bashkoi 207 66% Greek 
29% Georgian 
 Imera 74 84% Greek 
 Livadi 134 62% Greek 
25% Azeri 
 Qarakoni 177 73% Georgian 
19% Greek 
Burnasheti Village Burnasheti 468 97% Armenian 
Beshtasheni Comm. Beshtasheni 373 87% Greek 
 Kariaki 152 74% Greek 
17% Georgian 
 Shua Kharaba 54 87% Greek 
Gumbati Village Gumbati 471 82% Georgian 
Guniakala Village Guniakala 236 72% Greek 
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18% Georgian 
Darakoi Village Darakoi 814 98% Armenian 
Dashbashi Village Dashbashi 367 96% Armenian 
Edikilisa Village Edikilisa 351 96% Greek 
Aiazmi Village Aiazmi 595 99% Armenian 
Tejisi Village Tejisi 607 100% Azeri 
Tikilisa Village Tikilisa 167 77% Greek 
17% Georgian 
Kaburi Village Kaburi 491 100% Armenian 
Kushchi Village Kushchi 893 98% Armenian 
Nardevani Village Nardevani 1516 99% Armenian 
Ozni Village Ozni 754 99% Armenian 
Oliangi Village Oliangi 405 94% Armenian 
Rekha Village Rekha 525 79% Georgian 
20% Greek 
Qizilkilisa Village Qizilkilisa 1848 98% Armenian 
Chivtkilisa Village Chivtkilisa 468 99% Armenian 
Tsintsqaro Community Tsintsqaro 168 67% Greek 
20% Georgian 
10% Azeri 
 Santa 84 83% Georgian 
Khando Community Khando 187 98% Georgian 
Khachkoi Community Khachkoi 863 98% Armenian 
 Tazakharaba 137 99% Armenian 
Jinisi Village Jinisi 304 92% Greek 
 
